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Abstract. In this paper, we focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of
prevailing cooperation and sustaining cooperators. The social networks are representative of the interaction
relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary
Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a variant of Newman-Watts small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be
tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological
heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. That is, frequency of cooperators peaks at some specific
values of degree heterogeneity — neither the most heterogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one
would favor the cooperators. Besides, the average degree of networks and the adopted update rule also
affect the cooperation level.
PACS. 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory – 89.75.Hc Networks and genealogical trees – 87.23.Ge
Dynamics of social systems
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has been well developed as an
interdisciplinary science by researchers from biology, eco-
nomics, social science, computer science for several decades.
In past few years, it also gained the interests of physicists
to study some phenomena and intriguing mechanisms in
a e-mail: fufeng@pku.edu.cn
b e-mail: longwang@pku.edu.cn
well-mixed population by using mean-field theory of sta-
tistical physics. In classic game theory, the players are
assumed to be completely rational and try to maximize
their utilities according to opponents’ strategies. Under
these assumptions, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD
game), two players simultaneously decide whether to co-
operate (C) or to defect (D). They both receive R upon
mutual cooperation and P upon mutual defection. A de-
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fector exploiting a C player gets T , and the exploited
cooperator receives S, such that T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S. As a result, it is best to defect regardless of
the co-player’s decision. Thus, defection is the evolution-
arily stable strategy (ESS), even though all individuals
would be better off if they cooperated. Thereby this cre-
ates the social dilemma, because when everybody defects,
the mean population payoff is lower than that when ev-
erybody cooperates. However, cooperation is ubiquitous in
natural systems from cellular organisms to mammals. In
the past two decades, some extensions on PD game have
been considered to elucidate the underlying mechanisms
boosting cooperation behaviors by which this dilemma
could be resolved. For instance, depart from the well-
mixed population scenario, Nowak and May considered
PD game on spatially structured population [1]. All indi-
viduals are constrained to play only with their immediate
neighbors. They found that spatial structure enhances the
ability of cooperators to resist invasion by defectors.
The successful development of network science pro-
vides a systematic framework for studying the dynam-
ics processes taking place on complex networks [2,3]. For
most networks, including the World Wide Web, the Inter-
net, and the metabolic networks, they have small-world
property and are demonstrated to be scale-free [4,5]. The
network theory is a natural and convenient tool to de-
scribe the population structure on which the evolution
of cooperation is studied. Each vertex represents an in-
dividual and the edges denote links between players in
terms of game dynamical interaction. Trivially, one could
conclude that both well-mixed population and spatially-
structured population are represented by regular graphs.
It is, however, unrealistic to assume the real world is as
homogeneous as regular graphs. Furthermore, as afore-
mentioned, many real-world networks of interactions are
heterogeneous, namely, different individuals have different
numbers of average neighbors with whom they interact.
In [6], Abramson and Kuperman studied a simple model
of an evolutionary version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game
played in small-world networks. They found that defectors
prevail at some intermediate rewiring probability. By in-
troducing the volunteering participation, Szabo´ et al. in-
vestigated the spatio-temporal diagrams of the evolution-
ary process within the context of rewired lattices which
have small-world property [7]. Other paradigms of game
with spatially-structured population or on graphs, such
as snowdrift game, rock-scissors-paper game, public goods
game, etc, have been studied [8,9,10].
Recently, Santos and Pacheco discovered that in scale-
free networks, the cooperators become dominant for entire
range of parameters in evolutionary PD game and snow-
drift game [11]. They also demonstrated that the enhance-
ment of cooperation would be inhibited whenever the cor-
relations between individuals are decreased or removed.
Being similar to Hamilton’s rule, Ohtsuki et al described a
simple rule for evolution of cooperation on graphs and so-
cial networks — the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the aver-
age number of neighbors [12]. In [13,14], Santos suggested
that the heterogeneity of the population structure, espe-
cially scale-free networks, provides a new mechanism for
F. Fu et al.: Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network 3
cooperators to survive. Moreover, cooperators are capable
of exploiting the heterogeneity of the network of interac-
tions, namely, finally occupy the hubs of the networks.
Besides, Vukov and Szabo studied the evolutionary PD
game on hierarchical lattices and revealed that the high-
est stationary frequency of cooperators occurs in some in-
termediate layers [15]. Some researchers have studied mi-
nority game [16] , with small-world interactions [17], with
emergent scale-free leadership structure [18], etc. Howbeit,
these works are mostly studied on crystalized (static) net-
works, i.e., the topology of network is not affected by the
dynamics on it. Therefore, adapting the network topol-
ogy dynamically in response to the dynamic state of the
nodes should be taken into account. Evolutionary games
with “adaptive” network structure have been investigated
by some researchers [19,20].
In this paper, we consider evolutionary PD game on
a variant of Newman-Watts (NW) small-world network.
As is known, the NW small-world network is moderately
homogeneous. In order to investigate the heterogeneity’s
role in the emergence of cooperation for different tempta-
tions to defect, some artificial heterogeneity in network de-
gree sequences is introduced. Namely, some nodes are ran-
domly chosen as hubs and at least one endpoint of each of
the addedm shortcuts is linked to these hubs. The remain-
der of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the heterogeneous Newman-Watts (HNW) model and the
evolutionary PD game, including payoff matrix and the
microscopic updating rule. And then Sec. III gives out
the simulation results for different parameters and makes
some explanations to the results. Conclusions are made in
Sec. IV.
2 The model
2.1 The Heterogeneous Newman-Watts (HNW)
model
We consider one-dimensional lattice of N vertices with pe-
riodic boundary conditions, i.e., on a ring, and join each
vertex to its neighbors κ or fewer lattice spacing away.
Instead of rewiring a fraction of the edges in the regu-
lar lattice as proposed by Watts and Strogatz [4], some
“shortcuts” connecting randomly chosen vertex pairs are
added to the low-dimensional lattice [21]. To introduce
certain type of heterogeneity to this NW model [22], we
choose Nh vertices at random from all N nodes with equal
probabilities and treat them as hubs. Then we add each
of m shortcuts by connecting one node at random from
all N nodes to another node randomly chosen from the
Nh centered nodes (duplicate connections and self-links
are voided), see Fig. 1 as an illustration. In such heteroge-
neous Newman-Watts (HNW) model, nodes can be nat-
urally divided into two groups: hubs, which tend to have
higher connectivity, and the others that have lower con-
nectivity. Accordingly, the heterogeneity is controlled by
the parameter Nh : small Nh leads to higher degree of
the hubs, which in turn results in increased heterogene-
ity. Trivially, one could see that when Nh = N , shortcuts
are just simply added uniformly at random, effectively re-
ducing the network to the homogeneous Newman-Watts
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model. If Nh = 1, all shortcuts are linked to a single cen-
ter, making the network an extremely heterogeneous one.
The degree of heterogeneity of the network is computed as
h = N−1
∑
k k
2N(k)−〈k〉 (the variance of the network de-
gree sequcence), where N(k) gives the number of vertices
with k edges, 〈k〉 denotes the average degree. From Fig. 2,
it shows that variance σ2(= h) monotonically decreases
as the fraction number of hubs Nh/N increases. Thus we
simply use the fraction Nh/N to indicate the degree of
heterogeneity.
2.2 Evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game
Since the pioneering work on iterated games by Axel-
rod [23], the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game
has been a general metaphor for studying the cooperative
behavior. In the evolutionary PD game, the individuals
are pure strategists, following two simple strategies: co-
operate (C) and defect (D). The spatial distribution of
strategies is described by a two-dimensional unit vector
for each player x, namely,
s =


1
0

 and


0
1

 (1)
for cooperators and defectors, respectively. Each individ-
ual plays the PD game with its “neighbors” defined by
their who-meets-whom relationships and the incomes are
accumulated. The total income of the player at the site x
can be expressed as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sTxMsy (2)
where the Ωx denotes the neighboring sites of x, and the
sum runs over neighbor set Ωx of the site x. Without loss
of the generic feature of PD game, the payoff matrix has
a rescaled form, suggested by Nowak and May [24]
M =


1 0
b 0

 (3)
where 1 < b < 2. In evolutionary games the players are al-
lowed to adopt the strategy of one of their more successful
neighbors. Then the individual x randomly selects a neigh-
bor y for possibly updating its strategy. Since the success
is measured by the total payoff, whenever Py > Px the site
x will adopt y’s strategy with probability given by [11]
Wsx←sy =
Py − Px
bk>
(4)
where k> is the largest between site x’s degree kx and y’s
ky. This microscopic updating rule is some kind of imita-
tion process that is similar to Win-Stay-Lose-Shift rules in
spirit. Unlike the case of bounded rationality, such propor-
tional imitation (the take-over probability is proportional
to the payoff difference of the two sites) does not allow for
an inferior strategy to replace a more successful one.
3 Simulation results and discussions
Evolutionary PD game is performed analogically to repli-
cator dynamics: in each generation, all directly connected
pairs of individuals x and y engage in a single round game
and their accumulated payoffs are denoted by Px and Py
respectively. The synchronous updating rule is adapted
here. Whenever a site x is updated, a neighbor y is cho-
sen at random from all kx neighbors. The chosen neighbor
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takes over site x with probability Wsx←sy as Eq. (4), pro-
vided that Py > Px. Simulations were carried out for a
population of N = 2001 players occupying the vertices of
the HNW network. Initially, an equal percentage of co-
operators and defectors was randomly distributed among
the population. We confirm that different initial condi-
tions do not qualitatively influence the equilibrium results.
In Fig. 3, with fixed chosen hub numbers Nh = 41, the
equilibrium frequencies of cooperators with respect to dif-
ferent b are almost the same when started from different
initial conditions. Equilibrium frequencies of cooperators
were obtained by average over 2000 generations after a
transient time of 10000 generations. The evolution of the
frequency of cooperators as a function of b and Nh/N
has been computed. Furthermore, each data point results
from averaging over 100 simulations, corresponding to 10
runs for each of 10 different realizations of a given type of
network of contacts with the specified parameters. In the
following simulations, N = 2001, κ = 2 are kept invariant.
To investigate the influence of network degree hetero-
geneity to the evolution of cooperation, we fixed the value
of b when increased fraction of hubs Nh/N from 1/N to
1. Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium frequency of cooperators
as function of the fraction number of hubs Nh/N by dif-
ferent values of b for comparison when m = 1000. We find
the ρc’s curve exhibits non-monotonous behavior with a
peak at some specific value of Nh/N . As aforementioned,
the quantity Nh/N can be regarded as a measurement
of heterogeneity. For certain b, it has been illustrated in
Fig. 4, there is a clear maximum frequency of cooperators
around small Nh/N near the zero. In Fig. 5, we report
the result of frequency of cooperation as function of the
parameters space (b,Nh/N). It also shows that for fixed
b, optimum cooperation level exits at certain intermedi-
ate Nh/N . In addition, for certain intermediate Nh/N ,
the density of cooperation is higher than the cases when
Nh/N → 0 or Nh/N → 1. As a result, it reveals that op-
timal cooperation level occurs at intermediate topological
heterogeneity for some fixed b, that’s neither the most het-
erogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one favors the
cooperators best. Actually, under the most homogeneous
case of Nh/N = 1, the cooperation behavior is almost
extinct for large values of b. While under the most het-
erogeneous case of Nh/N = 1/N , the cooperation level
is also low. The reason for this is that, in the most het-
erogeneous case, all shortcuts are linked to a single node,
making the network star-like with sparse connections be-
tween the neighbor sites of the centered node. The pe-
ripheral nodes’ imitation strategies heavily depend upon
the centered individual’s choice. Once the unique largest
hub is occupied by a defector, defection will spread over
the entire network. Then the system can hardly recover
from the worst case of all defectors. Therefore the most
heterogeneous case with Nh/N = 1 is not the ideal case
for arising cooperation. The most homogeneous case with
Nh/N = 1 does not favor cooperation either. In this sit-
uation, all nodes almost have the same number of neigh-
bors with some long range shortcuts making the average
length short. Therefore, the defection of some node is eas-
ily spread from one node to another through the shortcuts.
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Within some generations, the defectors prevail on the net-
work. Hence the most homogeneous case with Nh/N = 1
does not promote the evolution of cooperation.
Let’s consider the case of intermediate heterogeneity
where some certain number of nodes are selected as hubs
(density of cooperators peaks at some specific value Nh/N
for fixed b). These hubs are connected to each other by
shortcuts or placed on the same ring linked by the reg-
ular edges. This provides the protection to each other in
resisting the invasion of defectors. Even if one hub is oc-
cupied by the defector, the cooperation level will tem-
porarily decrease due to the diffusion of defection from
the hub. However, other hubs occupied by cooperators
could reciprocally help each other and promote cooper-
ation behaviors on the network. Finally, cooperation is
recovered to the normal level. Accordingly, it in part re-
sult from the ability of cooperators taking advantage of
hubs. It is reported in [11] that cooperation dominates in
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) scale-free network due to the de-
gree heterogeneity where cooperators are more capable to
occupy the hubs in the network. Though the cooperation
level on our HNW model is not as high as it on the BA
scale-free network (see Fig. 6 and the figure in ref. [11] for
comparison), both of them benefit from the heterogeneity
of the network in the evolution of cooperation.
The average degree of HNW network 〈k〉 = 2κ+2m/N .
It is believed that average degree affects the evolution of
cooperation. Fig. 7 plots the frequency of cooperators ver-
sus Nh/N corresponding to different shortcuts number
m = 800, 1000, 1200 respectively with b = 1.1. We find
that increasing average degree (larger m) promotes co-
operation on the network. Nevertheless, we should point
out that with sufficient large m which makes the network
nearly fully-connected, the cooperation will be inhibited
due to mean-field behavior [25]. On the other hand, when
m changes, our above conclusion on the effect of hetero-
geneity to cooperation is still valid. We can see in Fig. 7
that, for different fixed m and b, ρC still peaks at certain
intermediate value of Nh/N .
We further explore the situation where we adopt an-
other microscopic update rule different from Eq. 4. In
stead of updating the strategies according to the accumu-
lated payoff of individuals, we consider using the average
payoff of individual x, P x =
Px
kx
. Thus the new update rule
is:
Wsx←sy =
P y − P x
b
(5)
By such update rule, we report the results in Fig. 8 cor-
responding to b = 1.1 and b = 1.3. It is found that the
equilibrium frequency of cooperation is not sensitive to
the heterogeneity as Nh/N increases from 1/N to 1 (the
curves of average payoff are almost flat). It is because
that normalizing individual’s payoff diminish the role of
heterogeneity. Consequently, the difference in individual’s
accumulated payoff arising from the degree heterogeneity
will be positive to evolution of cooperation. We should
be careful to come to a conclusion with different update
rules. Moreover, all these phenomena and conclusions are
also valid under the cases for different population size N .
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4 Conclusion remarks and future work
In conclusion, we have studied the effect of topological
heterogeneity to the evolution of cooperation behavior in
evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game. It is found that
frequency of cooperation peaks at some specific value of
Nh/N , that is, neither the most heterogeneous case nor
the most homogeneous one would favor cooperators. We
found that the network degree heterogeneity is one of the
factors affecting the emergence of cooperation. Besides,
the average degree and the adopted update rule also play
a role to cooperation. Therefore, it is meaningful and nec-
essary to explore the underlying factors that do matter
the emergence of cooperation behaviors. In addition, the
interplay between game dynamics and network topologies
is an interesting topic for further investigations.
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Fig.1 Illustration of the heterogeneous Newman-Watts
small-world model. A one-dimensional lattice with con-
nections between all vertex pairs separated by κ or fewer
lattice spacing, with κ = 2 in this case. The red dots are
chosen as centers or hubs and the added m shortcuts (the
dashed line) have at least one endpoint belonging to these
hubs.
Fig.2 The log-log plot of the variance of network degree
sequence versus fraction of hubs Nh/N for N = 2001,m =
1000. Each data point is averaged over 10 times different
realization corresponding to each Nh/N .
Fig.3 The plot of frequencies of cooperators as function
of temptation to defect b corresponding to the different ini-
tial fractions of cooperators 20%, 50%, 80%, respectively.
N = 2001, κ = 2,m = 1000, Nh = 41.
Fig.4 Frequency of cooperators as function of the frac-
tion of hubs Nh/N , for different values of the temptation
to defect b as shown in the legend. Note that when b = 1,
the game is not a proper PD game.
Fig.5 The frequency of cooperators ρc as function of
the parameter space (b,Nh/N). The red region indicates
the cooperation of high level corresponding to the inter-
mediate Nh and b.
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Fig.6 The frequencies of cooperators ρc vs. the temp-
tation to defect b with different levels of heterogeneity.
Fig.7 Plot of the fraction of cooperators vs. Nh/N for
different values of m with b = 1.1.
Fig.8 Plot of the results with update rules correspond-
ing to average and accumulated payoff respectively. Fig. 8-
A plots the case when b = 1.1 and Fig. 8-B with b = 1.3
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